Comparison of probabilistic choice models in humans by Takahashi, Taiki et al.
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
Behavioral and Brain Functions
Open Access Short paper
Comparison of probabilistic choice models in humans
Taiki Takahashi*1, Hidemi Oono2 and Mark HB Radford2
Address: 1Department of Life Sciences, Unit of Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences, School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 21 COE 
office, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-8902, Japan and 2Department of Behavioral Science, Faculty of Letters, Hokkaido University, N.10, 
W.7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, 060-0810, Japan
Email: Taiki Takahashi* - taikitakahashi@gmail.com; Hidemi Oono - oonyo@lynx.let.hokudai.ac.jp; 
Mark HB Radford - radford@let.hokudai.ac.jp
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background:  Probabilistic choice has been attracting attention in psychopharmacology and
neuroeconomics. Several parametric models have been proposed for probabilistic choice; entropy
model, Prelec's probability weight function, and hyperbola-like probability discounting functions.
Methods: In order to examine (i) fitness of the probabilistic models to behavioral data, (ii)
relationships between the parameters and psychological processes, e.g., aversion to possible non-
gain in each probabilistic choice and aversion to unpredictability, we estimated the parameters and
AICc (Akaike Information Criterion with small sample correction) of the probabilistic choice
models by assessing the points of subjective equality at seven probability values (95%–5%). We
examined both fitness of the models parametrized by utilizing AICc, and the relationships between
the model parameters and equation-free parameter of aversion to possible non-gain.
Results: Our results have shown that (i) the goodness of fitness for group data was [Entropy
model>Prelec's function>General hyperbola>Simple hyperbola]; while Prelec's function best fitted
individual data, (ii) aversion to possible non-gain and aversion to unpredictability are distinct
psychological processes.
Conclusion:  Entropy and Prelec models can be utilized in psychopharmacological and
neuroeconomic studies of risky decision-making.
Background
Studies in psychopharmacology, neuroscience, and
behavioral economics have revealed that humans and
non-human animals discount the value of probabilistic
rewards as the receipt becomes more uncertain ("proba-
bility discounting", [1-5]). Because pathological gambling
and drug misuse are associated with low degree of aver-
sion to uncertainty in probabilistic choice, it is of psy-
chopharmacological interest to examine probabilistic
choice models. In neoclassical economic theory, the
expected utility theory [6] has been allowed to express
subject' risk-attitude (risk-aversion/seeking). In Kahne-
man and Tversky's prospect theory [7], an extension of
expected utility theory models, a subjective value of a
probabilistic outcome is expressed as Af(p), where A is a
value of a certain reward and f(p) is a some function of p,
corresponding to subjective probability weight. However,
psychological processes underlying discounting uncertain
rewards are yet to be investigated. Several important find-
ings on probabilistic choice are observed in behavioral
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economic, behavioral ecological and psychopharmaco-
logical studies. For instance, (i) behavioral economists
have demonstrated that in probabilistic choice, small
probabilities are overweighted; while large probabilities
are underweighted [7-10], (ii) a theoretical framework for
intertemporal choice is useful for analyzing probabilistic
choice, by replacing delay in intertemporal choice with an
average waiting time until winning, i.e. "odds-against", O
= (1- probability)/probability [11-13], (iii) people have aver-
sion to loss of information about outcomes of decision
under uncertainty (e.g. ambiguity aversion, [14]). Based
on these findings, several types of parametric models of
probabilistic choice have been proposed in behavioral
economics, ecology, psychopharmacology, and neuroeco-
nomics as introduced below. However, to date, compari-
son of explanatory power of the probabilistic models, and
the relationships between parameters in the probabilistic
choice models and psychological processes have not
extensively investigated.
Entropy model
A probabilistic choice model based on information theory
and psychophysics has been proposed [15]. One reason
for the devaluation of uncertain rewards is aversion to loss
of information about outcomes. Uncertainty as lack of
information in probabilistic choice can be quantified with
Shannon entropy (S = -Σi pi log pi). It is to be noted that this
type of uncertainty is maximal at p = 0.5 (not at p = 0) and
minimal at p = 0 or 1. In addition, people overestimate
small probability, i.e., subjective probability is expressed
as pa (0 <a  < 1), following a psychophysical law [15].
Combining aversion to lack of information and overesti-
mation of probability, an impact of probability on a sub-
jective value of an uncertain outcome is pa- TS (a and T are
free parameters). Hence, a subjective value V of probabil-
istic reward is:
V = A [pa - T(- [p log2 p + (1 - p)log2(1 - p)])]
where A is the value of a certain reward when p = 1, 0 <a
<1 indicates a psychophysical effect on small probability
estimation (importantly, smaller a values correspond to
strong overestimation of small probability, because 0 <p <
1) and T is a degree of aversion to lack of information
[15]. A recent neuroimaging study employed a psycholog-
ically similar probabilistic choice model and reported that
during anticipation periods in probabilistic choice,
degrees of unpredictability were correlated with the acti-
vations in an area extending posterior to and bilateral
from the ventral striatum to the subthalamic nucleus as
well as mediodorsal thalamic nucleus, midbrain, and
bilateral anterior insula [16]. The entropy-based model of
probabilistic choice has an advantage that each parameter
has specific psychological correlates (i.e. psychophysics of
probability estimation and aversion to lack of informa-
tion).
Prelec's probability weight function
In order to explain subjects' tendency in probabilistic
choice; namely, overweighting of small probabilities and
underweighting large probabilities, the behavioral econo-
mist Prelec has axiomatically derived the following model
of probabilistic choice [8]:
V = Aexp [-β (-ln p)α],
where α and β are free parameters and ln indicates a natu-
ral log (= loge). An important characteristic of Prelec's
weight function is that this captures human bias in prob-
abilistic choice (i.e. overweighting of small probabilities
and underweighting of large probabilities). Notably,
when β  is assumed to be 1, V is equal to a statistical
expected value = Ap at p = 1/e ≈ 0.37, which is reportedly
consistent with several behavioral data [8-10]. A recent
neuroeconomic study (employing Prelec's weight func-
tion with the assumption of β = 1, following Prelec's pro-
posal) observed that α  is related to the activity of the
anterior cingulate in the brain, and the authors inter-
preted the activity of the anterior cingulated might reflect
subject's risk attitude in probabilistic choice [17]. How-
ever, it is still unknown whether the parameters in Prelec's
weight function are actually related to subject's risk aver-
sion (i.e., aversion to possible non-gain in each probabil-
istic choice and delay until winning, [11]). To examine
this question is a part of the objectives of the present
study.
Hyperbolic models
The behavioral psychologists Rachlin et al. hypothesized
that a small probability of receipt corresponds to a large
delay, based on the molar approach to the concept of
probabilistic choice [11]. According to the hypothesis,
subjects may discount probabilistic rewards as "odds
against", O = (1-p)/p (p = probability of receipt in each
probabilistic choice), increases (it should be noticed that
a larger odds against corresponds to a smaller probability
of receipt). Therefore, the "odds against" in probability
discounting has been hypothesized to play the same role
as the delay D in delay discounting functions in intertem-
poral choice [11]. Because a general type of delay dis-
counting functions is expressed as the general hyperbolic
function, according to Rachlin's hypothesis, a general
hyperbolic probability discounting function [18] should
be:
V = A/(1 + kO)s
where O = (1 - p)/p (odds against) and k and s are free
parameters indicating the subject's aversion to possibleBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:20 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/20
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delay (or possible non-gain in each probabilistic choice).
Several authors utilized a simpler form of hyperbolic
probability discounting function by setting s = 1 (simple
hyperbolic function, [11]):
V = A/(1 + kO).
Psychopharmacological studies have employed these
hyperbolic models to describe subjects' probabilistic
choice [1-4,19]. However, recent studies have cast a doubt
on the hypothetical equivalence of a decrease in probabil-
ity to an increase in delay; specifically, several studies
reported that parameters in delay and probability dis-
counting functions are not so strongly correlated as origi-
nally supposed [13,20], and some studies have reported
that neurobiological/psychopharmacological manipula-
tion distinctly impacts delay and probability discounting
[3,21]. Additionally, a recent study by Bickel's group has
proposed an analytical strategy combining delay and
probability [22].
In the present study, the goodness of fitness of each equa-
tion to the behavioral data in probabilistic choice was
quantified with AICc (Akaike Information Criterion with
small sample correction, a second-order AIC, [23]) and
compared at both group and individual levels. Further-
more, to avoid equation type-dependent systematic
errors, we also computed each subject's AUC (i.e., area
under the normalized indifference curve) [24] in order to
quantify the subject's degree of risk aversion (aversion to
possible non-gain in each probabilistic choice). Finally,
we computed correlation coefficients between the param-
eters in probabilistic choice models and individuals'
degrees of discounting probabilistic rewards, in order to
elucidate a psychological correlate of the parameters of
the probabilistic choice models.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-one (9 male and 12 female) volunteer students
from a major national university in Japan participated in
the experiment. The average age was 22.05 (SD = 2.2)
years. They were recruited from several psychology classes.
They participated in a probabilistic choice task, for their
parameters of probabilistic choice models to be esti-
mated.
Procedure
We used exactly the same experimental procedure as
Ohmura et al's [20] in the probabilistic choice task.
Firstly, participants were seated individually in a quiet
room, and face the experimenter across a table. After that,
participants received the simple instruction that the mon-
etary reward in this experiment was hypothetical, but the
experimenter wanted you to think as though it were real
money. Then the participants were asked to choose
between the card describing money delivered certainly
and the card describing money delivered with a certain
degree of probability. The left card viewed from partici-
pants indicated the amounts of money that could be
received certainly, and the right card indicated 100,000
yen that could be received with a certain probability.
For the probabilistic choice task, monetary rewards and
the probability were printed on 3 × 5 index cards. The 27
monetary reward amounts were 100,000 yen (about
$1,000), 99,000 yen, 96,000 yen, 92,000 yen, 85,000 yen,
80,000 yen, 75,000 yen, 70,000 yen, 65,000 yen, 60,000
yen, 55,000 yen, 50,000 yen, 45,000 yen, 40,000 yen,
35,000 yen, 30,000 yen, 25,000 yen, 20,000 yen, 15,000
yen, 10,000 yen, 8,000 yen, 6,000 yen, 4,000 yen, 2,000
yen, 1,000 yen, 500 yen, and 100 yen. The seven probabil-
ities of receipt were 95%, 90%, 70%, 50%, 30%, 10%, and
5%.
The experimenter turned the 27 100% cards sequentially.
The card started with 100,000 yen, down to 100 yen, and
back to 100,000 yen. For each card, the participant
pointed the certain (100%) or probabilistic reward. The
experimenter wrote down the last 100% reward chosen in
the descending order, and the first 100% reward chosen in
the ascending order, and the average of them was used as
the point of subjective equality (hereafter indifference
point) in the following analysis. This procedure was
repeated at each of the seven probabilities (for more
details, [20]).
Data analysis
We employed both equation type-dependent and -inde-
pendent parameters. For estimating equation type-
dependent parameters (i.e. a and T in the entropy model,
α and β in Prelec's weight function, k and s in the general
hyperbolic function, and k in the simple hyperbolic func-
tion). We fitted the four types of the model equations (i.e.
Equation 1–4) to the data (R statistical language, non-lin-
ear modeling package) and the fitness of each equation
was estimated with AICc (Akaike Information Criterion
with small sample correction) values, which is the most
standard criterion for the fitness of mathematical model
to observed data with a small sample size [23]. It should
be noted that the comparison between the R-square val-
ues of equations with different numbers of free parame-
ters are statistically irrelevant (note that an increase in the
numbers of free parameters in a fitting equation always
yield a larger R-square value[25]). Therefore, we com-
pared AICc values for the equations (note that smaller
AICc values correspond to better fitting). Furthermore,
calculating R-square values demonstrated that, the mod-
els with two parameters (i.e. Entropy, Prelec, and general
hyperbola) had larger R-squre values than the simpleBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:20 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/20
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hyperbola (which is a statistically trivial result), but no
statistically significant difference was observed between
the models with two parameters. Because utilizing R-
square in non-linear curve fitting is statistically problem-
atic [23], we do not present R-square values below.
For an equation type-independent parameter of probabil-
istic choice, we adopted AUC, which is defined as the nor-
malized area under the linkage of indifference points (i.e.,
subjective values) at each odds against (= (1- probability)/
probability [11]). The rationale for employing AUC is that
(i) AUC indicates subject's aversion to possible non-gain
(or possible temporal delay until winning [11], (ii) AUC
does not depend on the type of fitting functions, and (iii)
studies in psychopharmacology often utilize AUC as an
equation-free parameter for probabilistic choice [3,24].
In order to examine the relationship between the parame-
ters of the probabilistic choice models and subject's
degree of aversion to possible non-gain (risk aversion), we
utilized Pearson's correlation analyses between the
parameters of the model equations and AUC, because
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests revealed no significant devia-
tion from Gaussian distribution in all parameter distribu-
tions (p  > .05). It is to be noted that a significant
correlation in the Pearson's analysis indicates that the
parameter is related to psychological processes of aversion
to possible non-gain (or possible waiting time until win-
ning).
For the analysis of group data, we utilized group median
data [26]. The reason is that a (linearly averaged) group
mean may not be a valid statistical summary of group data
when the relationship between probability values and
subjective values is non-linear.
All statistical procedures were conducted with R statistical
language (The R Project for Statistical Computing). Data
are expressed as Mean and/or Median ± Standard Error of
Mean (SEM). Significance level was set at 5% throughout
(for pairwise multiple comparisons, Bonferoni's correc-
tion was utilized).
Results
Fitness of probabilistic choice models for group data
After fitting each model to the group median data, we
then employed AICc as an index of fitness (see Table 1 for
estimated parameters and AICcs for the group data). As
shown in Table 1, β in Prelec's weight function was close
to 1 as previously reported [8] and general hyperbolic s
was smaller than 1 as originally proposed [18,25]. The
orders of the AICcs for medians were [entropy model <
Prelec's weight function < general hyperbolic function <
simple hyperbolic function]. Plots between the observed
behavioral data and prediction of each model for compar-
ison are presented in Fig. 1. As can be seen, the simple
hyperbolic function failed to predict subjective values of
the probabilistic reward at small and large probability val-
ues, in comparison to the three other probabilistic choice
models, indicating that subjects' probabilistic choice has
anomalies at small and large probability values (i.e., sub-
jects overweight small probabilities but underweight large
probabilities), which cannot exactly be modeled by the
simple hyperbolic function.
Fitness of probabilistic choice models for individual data
Nonlinear curve fitting of the general hyperbolic function
to one subject's behavioral data did not converge and this
subject's behavioral data were not included in further
analysis. Therefore, a total of 20 subjects' data were fitted
by each probabilistic choice model. It is important to note
that averaged β in Prelec's function was close to 1 and s in
the general hyperbolic function was smaller than 1 as we
have shown for group data. Further, corresponding AICcs
were calculated (Table 2). A one-way repeated measure
ANOVA with equation type (Equation 1–4) as a four-level
within-subjects factor revealed a significant difference
regarding probabilistic choice models, F(3, 19) = 7.5679,
p < .01. The subsequent posthoc pairwise multiple t-tests
with Bonferoni's correction revealed that Prelec's weight-
ing function significantly better fitted the observed indi-
vidual data than the simple hyperbolic function (p < .05),
again indicating that the simple hyperbolic function most
poorly fitted the behavioral data. It might be concluded
that Prelec's weight function best fitted the individual
behavioral data. The estimated individual parameters are
summarized in Table 2.
Correlation between probabilistic model parameters and 
AUC for individual data
Finally, we examined the correlation between the individ-
uals' parameters for each probabilistic choice model and
AUCs (Fig. 2). Among the model parameters, a in the
entropy model, β  in Prelec's weight function, general
hyperbolic s, simple hyperbolic k are significantly nega-
tively correlated with AUC (note that smaller AUC corre-
sponds to greater degree of aversion to possible non-gain)
(p < .05), indicating that these parameters are related to
subject's degree of risk aversion. In contrast, T  in the
entropy model (an indicator of subject's degree of aver-
sion to unpredictability) did not significantly correlate
with AUC (p > .05), implying that risk aversion and aver-
sion to lack of information are distinct psychological
processes. It should further be noticed that α in Prelec's
weight function did not significantly correlate with AUC,
implying that α may not be an indicator of risk aversion.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this study is the first to systematically
examine the fitness of probabilistic choice models byBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:20 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/20
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employing AICc as an indicator of the fitness. Previous
studies have focused on the comparison of R-square val-
ues; however, this is problematic and statistically irrele-
vant, because the model equations have different
numbers of free parameters and non-linear [18,23,25].
Comparison of probabilistic choice models at the group 
level
The order of fitness of the model is [entropy model >
Prelec's weight function > general hyperbolic function >
simple hyperbolic function]. Although the differences are
not dramatically large in a quantitative sense, it may be
recommended, in future psychopharmacological studies
on probabilistic choice, to utilize the entropy model for
examining group differences, in order to elucidate the dis-
tinctions in neuropharmacological mechanisms between
healthy controls and addicts. Moreover, it should be
noted that β was close to 1, which confirms that people's
probability estimation is the most accurate at the proba-
bility value of about 0.37, as Prelec originally proposed
and observed in behavioral data [8]. However, this does
not necessarily allow us to assume β = 1 a priori.
Comparison of probabilistic choice models at the 
individual level
Prelec's weight function may be the best to parametrize
each individual's probabilistic choice, when the objective
of the study is to solely reveal individual differences in
probabilistic choice. Several authors in neuroeconomics
have assumed β = 1 and estimate α in order to assess indi-
vidual differences in risk aversion. However, the problem
of Prelec's function is that the parameters α and β do not
have clear interpretation, in terms of psychological func-
tioning. We therefore examined the relationships between
parameters in each probabilistic choice model and AUC
(an index of risk-aversion [11]), in order to better under-
stand the psychological interpretation of parameters in
the probabilistic choice models.
Relationships between probabilistic model parameters and 
AUC
Our correlational analysis demonstrated that a in the
entropy model, β in Prelec's weight function, and general
hyperbolic  s, and simple hyperbolic k  were associated
with each subject's risk aversion (assessed with AUC, see
Fig. 2). It is important to note that T in the entropy model
did not relate to risk aversion, confirming that aversion to
lack of information and risk are distinct psychological
processes [14]. Psychological interpretation for this dis-
tinction is that unpredictability-aversive subjects do not
necessarily avoid uncertain rewards with very small prob-
abilities (i.e., predictable non-gains), due to predictability
of the outcomes. Our result is, as far as we know, the first
to dissociate these two attitudes toward uncertainty in a
parametric manner. Furthermore, the finding that not α
but β in Prelec's weight function was associated with risk
aversion is also important. This finding implies that when
the objective of the study is to assess each subject's risk
aversion, β should not be assumed to be 1. It is also con-
firmed that simple hyperbolic k, rather than general
hyperbolic k is related to subject's risk aversion. Moreover,
as can be seen from Fig. 2, simple hyperbolic parameters
at large values are not good predictors of AUC. This is also
an important point of cautions for psychopharmacologi-
cal study on probabilistic choice employing hyperbolic
function parameters.
Limitations and future directions
We now discuss limitations of the present study. Because
the present study employed hypothetical money,
although discounting behaviors of real and hypothetical
rewards have been shown to correlate [27,28], it is not
completely evident that the degrees of discounting real
monetary gains were exactly reflected. However, probabi-
listic choice tasks with real money have other limitations;
e.g., it is virtually impossible or difficult to utilize large
real rewards and real monetary loss, and paying real
money for randomly selected participants introduces
another probabilistic factor. Nevertheless, real gambling
tasks such as the IOWA gambling task [29] may also help
Table 1: Parameters and AICc (Akaike Information Criterion with small sample correction) of probabilistic choice models for group 
data
Entropy model Prelec's function General hyperbola Simple 
hyperbola
AICc 137.96 138.61 139.46 143.05
Parameter aTαβksk
0.59437 0.21222 0.75456 1.02024 3.21403 0.55207 1.195
For group median data (N = 21) for each indifference point, goodness of fitting was [Entropy model>Prelec's function>General hyperbola>Simple 
hyperbola]. Note that smaller AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) corresponds to better fitting to behavioral data. It was confirmed that β ≈ 1, and 
s < 1 for group data.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:20 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/20
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understand neuropsychological functioning underlying
probabilistic choice. Furthermore, it is also of interest to
examine the relationship between ambiguity aversion in
decision under uncertainty with unknown probability
[14] and subjects' degree of unpredictability aversion, to
elucidate substance abusers' risk-taking, and psychophar-
macological treatment for impulsive behavior.
Group median data of probabilistic choice (dots) are presented with lines of prediction from the four types of probabilistic  choice models: (a) entropy model, (b) Prelec's weight function, (c) general hyperbolic function, (d) simple hyperbolic function Figure 1
Group median data of probabilistic choice (dots) are presented with lines of prediction from the four types of probabilistic 
choice models: (a) entropy model, (b) Prelec's weight function, (c) general hyperbolic function, (d) simple hyperbolic function. 
Horizontal axis indicates probability values (0–1), while vertical axis indicates a subjective value (0–100,000 yen) of the uncer-
tain reward at each value of probability. It can be seen that the simple hyperbolic function poorly fit the data at small and large 
probability values.
a b
c dBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:20 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/20
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Scatterplots of individual parameter values of each probabilistic choice model (horizontal axis): (a) parameters of entropy  model, (b) parameters of Prelec's weight functions, (c) parameters of general hyperbolic function, and (d) a parameter of simple  hyperbolic function) and AUC (Area Under the Curve, vertical axis) Figure 2
Scatterplots of individual parameter values of each probabilistic choice model (horizontal axis): (a) parameters of entropy 
model, (b) parameters of Prelec's weight functions, (c) parameters of general hyperbolic function, and (d) a parameter of simple 
hyperbolic function) and AUC (Area Under the Curve, vertical axis). Note that small AUC indicates subject's strong aversion 
to possible non-gain in each probabilistic choice (risk aversion). Note that a of entropy model, β of Prelec's weight function, 
and s of general hyperbolic function, and k of simple hyperbolic function were significantly negatively correlated with AUC, 
while other parameters such as T in the entropy model (an indicator of aversion to unpredictability) were not significantly cor-
related with AUC.
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Table 2: AICc (Akaike Information Criterion with small sample correction) and parameters of probabilistic choice models for 
individual data
Entropy model Prelec's function General hyperbola Simple 
hyperbola
AICc 133.31 ± 1.79 129.38 ± 1.80 130.82 ± 1.80 139.91 ± 1.80
Parameter aTαβksk
0.691 ± 0.090 0.197 ± 0.045 0.774 ± 0.068 1.063 ± 0.075 10.910 ± 3.23 0.6348 ± 0.110 1.59 ± 0.33
All values are expressed as mean ± SEM. Note that β ≈ 1, and s < 1 for averaged values, and Prelec's model significantly better fit individual data than 
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Conclusion
Our present study demonstrated that (i) the entropy
model best fit group level data of probabilistic choice, (ii)
Prelec's weight function best fit individual data, and (iii)
aversions to risk and lack of information are distinct psy-
chological processes. Further studies are required in order
to answer whether psychiatrics such as drug-dependent
subjects and pathological gamblers actually differ in
parameters in the entropy model and Prelec's weight func-
tion.
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